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ABSTRACT
This paper draws on interviews with 57 corporate ﬁnance lawyers
working from global law ﬁrms based in the City of London.
Drawing on this data, we highlight common themes of taking
deals at ‘face value’, being the lawyer-technician who uses the law
to effect his client’s wishes, and not ‘pushing’ ethics. We suggest
that there is an apathy – a lack of concern or interest – about
ethics on the part of corporate lawyers. This apathy stems from
various sources. It is linked to assumptions about the sorts of
clients that large law ﬁrms are willing or not willing to act for, and
assumptions about the ‘right sort of people’ the ﬁrm hires and
retains; it is linked to strong notions of role morality; and it is
founded on the classic legal ethics ‘standard conception’
principles of neutrality and non-accountability. Our data also
highlights a lack of ethical infrastructures in large ﬁrms, and a lack
of ethical leadership from law ﬁrm partners for the associates and
trainees working for them.
KEYWORDS
Corporate lawyers; large law
ﬁrms; standard conception;
apathy; regulation; ethical
infrastructure; non-
accountability; neutrality
I: How would you describe an ethical lawyer?
R: If you mean by ethical do I quiz my clients to make sure none of them participate in any
abuse of human rights up or down the supply chain for example? Well, no I don’t. For
all I know we are using solar panels made by child labour in China or something. (CP8,
renewable energy lawyer)
Forty years ago, the American jurist Charles Fried asked the question: ‘Can a good lawyer
be a good person?’.1 The answer over those intervening ﬁve decades has been, at various
times and for various people: yes; no; and maybe. In this paper we draw on empirical data
from interviews with 57 lawyers based in the City of London to suggest that the modern-
day corporate lawyer is ethically apathetic: neither good nor bad, but rather indifferent and
unenthusiastic when it comes to the ethics of what they do and the impacts their work may
have. We show how these corporate lawyers articulate their client-centred, client-ﬁrst role
along the classic lines of the ‘standard conception’ of legal ethics: as such, it is not for them
to judge what their clients do, nor should they be held accountable for the actions of their
clients. Running parallel to this articulation, however, are various, closely held, somewhat
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Steven Vaughan s.vaughan@bham.ac.uk
1C Fried, ‘The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer–Client Relationship’ (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal 1060.
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hypocritical and highly personalised ‘redlines’ (things which corporate lawyers will not do
for their clients) which, for reasons that will become obvious, we call the ‘gorilla excep-
tions’. We are of the view that such ethical apathy is potentially harmful given the impor-
tant role corporate lawyers can play as norm intermediaries between their clients and the
limits of the law,2 and given that ethical apathy may well give rise to ethnical numbness.3
The paper unfolds in three parts. First, we set the scene by talking about legal ethics,
both from the viewpoint of the moral philosophers and from how we see ethics written
down in the regulatory codes of the legal services regulators in England and Wales.
This is so that we can compare and contrast those debates and approaches with how cor-
porate lawyers themselves speak about ethics. The second part sets out our methodology,
and situates our work in the wider ﬁeld. This paper engages with important aspects of con-
temporary professional life in large law ﬁrms, and in a ﬁeld where other existing empirical
work on corporate lawyers in large law ﬁrms is scarce.4 Finally, we turn to how our inter-
viewees responded to various questions on legal ethics and a number of ethical hypothe-
tical scenarios. This paper is unapologetically thick with data, and we draw heavily on the
words our interviewees used to frame their approaches to questions of legal ethics. Our
paper is concerned partly with ‘applied’ legal ethics and partly with issues of moral phil-
osophy, but is primarily focused on the ‘realist approach’ seen in other empirical research
on legal ethics where ‘the starting point in studying legal institutions should be as they
actually are’ in order that they can then held up to scrutiny.5 We suggest that the approach
of corporate lawyers in large law ﬁrms to ethics is a powerful and underexplored ﬁeld in
which to map and comment on tensions between the conception of professionalism as a
monopolistic legal services market control device, or professionalism as an ethical com-
mitment to public service and public beneﬁt.
Competing approaches to lawyers’ ethics
The moral philosophy literature on lawyers’ ethics is vast. For present purposes we need
only to offer up a snapshot such that, in our later review of what our interviewees said to
us, we can map their responses onto some of the relevant key debates. For the moral phi-
losophers, tensions exist between the ‘standard conception’ of lawyer’s ethics (in which
lawyers are seen as owing ‘special duties to the clients that allow and perhaps even
require conduct that would otherwise be morally reprehensible’),6 and other conceptions
based on notions of ‘justice’ or morality.
The standard conception sees lawyers do all that is permissible for their clients within
the bounds of the law. At the core of the ‘standard conception’ (cloven to to various
degrees by different scholars) are the value-trinity of: (1) neutrality (it is not for the
lawyer to be the judge of their client); (2) partisanship (the lawyer can or may do all
that they can to achieve the client’s objectives); and (3) non-accountability (the
2S Sturm, ‘Law’s Role in Addressing Complex Discrimination’ in Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L Nelson (eds), Handbook of
Employment Discrimination Research (Springer, 2005).
3R O’Brien, ‘Ethical Numbness: Some Glimpses of Lawyers Across Asia and the South Paciﬁc’ (2012) 5 Journal of International
Business Ethics 40.
4We discuss this further in the Methodology section.
5H Sommerlad, ‘Editorial’ (2014) 17 Legal Ethics i, iii.
6T Dare, ‘Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers’ (2004) 7 Legal Ethics 24.
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lawyer is not responsible for the client’s decisions).7 These three principles form an
important part of our discussion below. Some of those who take the ‘standard con-
ception’ approach argue that we live in a pluralistic society based on competing
notions of the public good, that the institutions of law are designed to mediate
between these diverse ranges of views, and that it is not for lawyers to determine
‘what we will do as a community, what rights we will allocate and to whom’.8 Others,
who take the same approach, base their arguments on the lawyer as a technical mechanic
who should respect the autonomy of their client,9 or on the idea of the ‘civil obedience’ of
a lawyer who obeys the law (including professional obligations to a client) even when it
conﬂicts with her own morals.10
The standard conception has many critics. One of the core objections lies in the fact
that
The law does not provide some ﬁxed point of reference but can be adapted by clever lawyers
to their clients’ needs. Rather than replacing client interests with legal entitlements, lawyers
just obscure the rent-seeking process with a rhetorical façade.11
As an alternative to the standard conception, Simon would have lawyers make contex-
tual, discretionary judgements about justice. They ‘should take those actions that, con-
sidering the relevant circumstances of the case, seem likely to promote justice’.12 Here,
and in line with Dworkin,13 ‘justice’ is a synonym for ‘legal merit’, with lawyers analysing
the law in the light of fundamental legal values and principles to arrive at substantively
just outcomes. Simon’s preference for legal merits-based reasoning (over a lawyer who
uses her own morals) is founded on the idea that lawyers, being lawyers, have the necess-
ary knowledge and skills to problematise legal ethics issues in terms of competing legal
values (and do not have any special morality that makes them any better able than
anyone else to approach ethical issues in terms of morals). Luban disagrees, and
instead suggests that common morality can trump the professional role in certain cir-
cumstances. He argues that ‘no form of reasoning, artiﬁcial or not, can bear the
burden of discerning right from wrong in particular cases’,14 and that ‘some laws are
morally unacceptable under any interpretation that does not do violence to the
text’.15 We are of the view that Simon’s approach may reify legal reasoning and being
7See also: Fried (n 1); ML Schwartz, ‘The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers’ (1978) 66 Cal L Rev 669; and R Was-
serstrom, ‘Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues’ (1975) 5 Human Rights 1.
8Dare (n 6). Here, Dare sees the lawyer as the instrument of the institution of law. Postema disagrees: ‘The lawyer must
recognise that the institution acts only through the voluntary activities of the lawyer and client. The lawyer is not the
instrument of the institution, rather the institution is the instrument of the client and the client engages the lawyers
to make use of the instrument.’ G Postema, ‘Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics’ (1980) 55 New York University
Law Review 63, 89.
9S Pepper, ‘The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem and Some Possibilities’ (1986) American Bar Foundation
Research Journal 613. Schneyer also writes of the importance of respect for a client’s autonomy; see T Schneyer, ‘Moral
Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics’ (1984) Wisconsin Law Review 1529, 1539.
10A Woolley and B Wendel, ‘Legal Ethics and Moral Character’ (2010) 23 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1065. Wendel
argues that ‘the law supersedes societal controversy and provides a moderately stable, provisional framework for
cooperation, notwithstanding normative and empirical disagreement.’ W Bradley Wendel, ‘Legal Ethics is About the
Law, Not Morality or Justice: A Reply to Critics’ (Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 1202, 2012) 2. See also W
Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton University Press, 2010).
11Wendel (2012) ibid, 3.
12WH Simon, The Practice of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2000) 138.
13R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (2nd edn, Hart Publishing, 1998) 52ff.
14D Luban, ‘Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 873, 876.
15Ibid 887.
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inducted into the law, into learning to ‘think like a lawyer’. For example, it assumes that
lawyers, through time and experience, ‘correctly’ learn legal reasoning and how to arrive
at ‘correct’ decisions relatively unproblematically. Such also assumes that there is a
‘correct’ view of law. Empirical data would tend to suggest that while there is a distinct
logic of practice to ‘legal’ reasoning, it nevertheless remains a cultural practice and, as
such, is informed by the wider social context. For example, criminal law lawyers have
been shown repeatedly to be informed by their cultural context in ways that put the
‘workgroup’ (such as magistrates, other court staff with whom they regularly interact,
and other lawyers) before their clients.16 Simon’s perspective therefore downplays the
ways in which power relations shape the way that law is created, interpreted and
used, and so fails to see the inherently political and contingent nature of ‘legal
reasoning’.
Under Luban’s approach, lawyers would engage in ‘moral reﬂection’ when they
encounter ethical dilemmas.17 Such, he argues, is a less ‘professorial’ endeavour than
the pursuit of justice require by Simon,18 not least because we all have emotional reactions
to ethical questions. Luban’s approach requires that lawyers not hide behind their pro-
fessional status or the adversarial system ‘to release themselves from moral obligations
they would have if they weren’t lawyers’.19 When Luban’s lawyer encounters certain
ethical dilemmas, ‘they will sometimes ﬁnd their conscience compelling them to
disobey the principle of partisanship as well, by refraining from morally improper
tactics or by declining to pursue objectionable client ends’.20 Like Luban, Postema suggests
that there is a ‘dangerous simpliﬁcation of moral reality’ (and a corollary dangerous risk of
moral distance) in expecting lawyers to act in their professional lives in a way that is
morally contrary to how they would act in their private lives.21 Known commonly as
role morality, such separation may, Bellow and Kettleson argue, ‘atrophy those qualities
of moral sensitivity and awareness upon which all ethical behaviour depends’.22 Luban
tries to articulate the case that role morality makes strong claims over personal moral pre-
ferences, but that ‘common morality’ (where it is clear and strong) can trump role
morality.
There has been signiﬁcant pushback against the idea of the justice-seeking or morally
activist lawyer. Schneyer, for example, writes that the moral philosophers (not being
practising lawyers) come to the territory of legal ethics as ‘missionaries rather than pro-
spectors. And missionaries bent on converting the Bar are what the philosophers have
mostly been’.23 In their critique, Woolley and Wendel argue that such approaches
offer up ‘idealized portraits of the moral [lawyer] agent’.24 In this they must be right,
16See, for example: D Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013); and H Sommerlad, ‘The
Implementation of Quality Initiatives and the New Public Management in the Legal Aid Sector in England and Wales:
Bureaucratisation, Stratiﬁcation and Surveillance’ (1999) 6 International Journal of the Legal Profession 311–43.
17Luban (n 14) 893.
18Ibid 894.
19D Luban, ‘How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel’ (2010) 23 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1101,
1118.
20D Luban, ‘Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer–Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann’ (1990) 90
Columbia Law Review 1004, 1005.
21Postema (n 8) 64.
22G Bellow and J Kettleson, ‘The Mirror of Public Interest Ethics: Problems and Paradoxes’ in American Bar Association (ed),
Professional Responsibility: A Guide for Attorneys (ABA, 1978).
23Schneyer (n 9).
24Wooley and Wendel (n 10).
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but we would suggest that imagining how the world could and should be is an essential
dimension of the human condition and an important part of conversations about legal
practice. At the same time, the normative should not be privileged over accounts of how
humans actually behave and considerations of why this is so – in terms of identifying
broad ‘general’ patterns, and also in particular contexts. Each requires the other.
Equally, and as Luban argues, ‘being difﬁcult to fulﬁl is not in itself a legitimate
reason for rejecting a conception of moral agency’.25 These disagreements, in part at
least, concern where the bar should be set. That is, they concern the standard by
which we might judge the conduct of lawyers. Such disagreements also pull between
aspirational conduct goals and what appears to be pessimism about legal practice in
the real world. Here, and offering himself up as a ‘man of the [lawyer] people’,
Wendel writes:
In my view, which I think is shared by most practitioners, lawyers are not all purpose agents
who facilitate moral deliberation; rather, they are simultaneously representatives of their
clients and ministers of the law who help clients ﬁt their conduct within the scheme of
rights and duties created by the law.26
As we will come to show, Wendel’s articulation ﬁts well with how our interviewees framed
their own roles.
Each of the competing approaches to legal ethics we have outlined has limitations. For
the standard conception lawyer, being faithful to the law and working out exactly what
the ‘law’ is, or the ‘legal entitlements’ of any given client,27 may be challenging in situ-
ations in which the law is unclear, or in which there are competing interpretations of the
law.28 Pepper counters by arguing that ‘questions of interpretation and application [are]
the normal grist for the lawyer’s mill’.29 While this may (to varying degrees) be true, such
an approach opens up grey areas for debate in which lawyers could push the spirit of the
law towards their client’s goals. Here, Dare suggests that lawyers should not engage in
what would amount to ‘abuses of process’ in their zealous pursuit of a client’s legal enti-
tlements,30 although such (at least in his formulation) would require lawyers in engaging
in exactly the sort of thinking processes (i.e. bottoming out why the client wants what the
client wants) that he rejects as part of the approach taken by Luban and others. The
lawyer seeking substantively just outcomes may be required to engage in intellectual
exercises beyond the ordinary capacity of many,31 and the morally activist lawyer may
lack the disposition to resist institutional compliance,32 or indeed lack the power to
effect change (for example, given increased competition for clients, and the corollary
25Luban (n 19) 1102.
26Wendel (2012) (n 10) 7.
27Using Dare’s language (n 6) 30ff.
28Here, Dare suggests it would be arrogant of lawyers to introduce their own morals into client relationships. However,
what is not clear is why it is any less arrogant for lawyers to do their own determination of a client’s legal entitlements.
Such approach also assumes (wrongly) that the determination of legal entitlements will also be straightforward (ibid).
29SL Pepper, ‘Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as a Client)’ (2015) 28 Geor-
getown Journal of Legal Ethics 1069, 1100.
30Dare (n 6) 34ff.
31Woolley and Wendel (n 10).
32On this, see the discussion by Luban (2010) (n 19) 16 ff. See further, on the morally activist lawyer: RK Vischer, ‘Legal
Advice as Moral Perspective’ (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 225.
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reduction in client loyalty to large ﬁrms).33 It is also clear that ‘reasonable, conscientious
people may disagree in good faith about what is required by morality or justice in a par-
ticular situation’.34
One of the stronger pushbacks against a moral philosophy approach to consideration of
lawyers’ ethical dilemmas argues that ‘the common ﬁnancial, psychological and organisational
pressures of law practice explain the exclusively client regarding behaviour of lawyers better
than the rules of legal ethics’.35 Here, the suggestion is that an exploration of what lawyers
actually do is a more valid approach than abstract questions of how lawyers should be.36
As set out above, we are of the view that both are important: we need both an idea of what
the ‘ideal lawyer type’ should be and an idea of how far we are away from that ideal (for scho-
larly purposes, but also for the practical purposes of education and regulation). What lawyers
ought to do must begin with a clear understanding of how lawyers actually behave in situ, and
how this relates to their speciﬁc practice contexts, as well as wider organisational, social and
economic conditions of their work: in Bourdieu’s terms, the ways in which their everyday
practices reﬂect the relationship between their ﬁeld and habitus.37 Like Woolley, and
Parker, we see legal ethics as simultaneously practical and normative.38
Legal ethics written down
The regulatory ﬁeld for lawyers in England and Wales is complex: there are nine types of
regulated professional providing reserved legal services, and nine different legal services
regulators.39 For this paper, we need only concern ourselves with the Solicitors Regulation
Authority (SRA), the body responsible for regulating solicitors in England and Wales.
These 130,000 practising solicitors are found in over 10,000 law ﬁrms and over 6000
private and public employers.40 Our focus is on the top end of the ‘corporate hemi-
sphere’.41 The SRA takes a three-pronged approach to standard setting and principles
in the context of lawyers’ ethics: (1) it sets out high level, mandatory ‘principles’; (2) it
gives a series of detailed, topic speciﬁc rules on conduct; and (3) it promulgates a statement
on the competence of qualiﬁed solicitors (which includes, among other things, ethical
matters).42 The 10 high-level principles – found at the very front of the SRA’s Handbook
– are ‘mandatory’ and apply to all solicitors at all times. They cover a wide range of
matters, including the rule of law, the client’s interests, independence, respecting the
33DD Wilkins, ‘Race, Ethics and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?’ (994) 63 George
Washington Law Review 1030, 1088. See further: D Kershaw and R Moorhead, ‘Consequential Responsibility for Client
Wrongs: Lehman Brothers and the Regulation of the Legal Profession’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 26.
34Wendel (2012) (n 10) 7. This also ties in with the position by some scholars that there is no ‘universal morality’.
35Schneyer (n 9) [1543].
36See D Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession (Oxford University Press, 2003); S Dolovich, ‘Ethical
Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity’ (2002) 70 Fordham Law Review 1629; and Wendel (2012) (n 10) 3, who ‘will only
suggest that legal scholars should pay more attention to what lawyers actually do, as opposed to arguing about
abstractions’.
37P Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge University Press, 1977)
38A Woolley, ‘The Problem of Disagreement in Legal Ethics Theory’ (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 181; C
Parker, ‘A Critical Morality for Lawyers: Four Approaches to Legal Ethics’ (2004) 30 Monash University Law Review 53.
39See <http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/can_we_help/approved_regulators/> accessed 10 May 2016.
40Law Society, ‘Trends in the Solicitors Profession: Annual Statistical Report 2015’ (Law Society, London, April 2016).
41JP Heinz and EO Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (Russell Sage Foundation and American Bar
Foundation, 1982).
42The SRA is also, of course, engaged in the discipline of solicitors, has an Ethics helpline, undertakes ‘ﬁtness’ reviews of
those wishing to join the profession, and so on.
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regulator, and issues of equality and diversity. These 10 principles are not ranked, and the
SRA makes it clear that no one principle takes precedence. Instead, if the principles come
into conﬂict, the SRA Handbook sets out that the principle which best serves the ‘public
interest’ is the way forward.43 As we have argued elsewhere, such use of the notion of
‘public interest’ may bring with it signiﬁcant uncertainty and challenge.44 What is also
important to keep in mind when we come to look at the data is that nowhere, at no
point, does the SRA say in its Handbook (or, indeed, anywhere else) that the client’s inter-
ests come ﬁrst. They do not.
Further on in the SRA’s Handbook are detailed conduct rules on matters including
conﬁdentiality, client acceptance, anti-money laundering, conﬂicts of interest, and so
on.45 What we will see from the rest of this paper is that corporate lawyers cleave to,
and know about, these topic-speciﬁc rules far more than they cleave to, or know
about, the 10 underlying, front-end, mandatory principles in the Handbook. This may
be of signiﬁcant concern (in that the conduct rules are largely context and point-in-
time speciﬁc, whereas the principles apply at all times).46 In March 2015, the SRA
released a ‘Competence Statement’ that sets out the expected standards of all qualiﬁed
solicitors. The Statement begins with the following two requirements: (1) ‘recognising
ethical issues and exercising effective judgment in addressing them’; and (2) ‘under-
standing and applying the ethical concepts which govern their role and behaviour as
a lawyer’.47 Our data suggest that, on one reading, a good number of corporate
lawyers may fall some way short of competence when it comes to these two
requirements.
Despite the increasing regulatory complexity we have just outlined, and the enormous
range of activities that legal practice now covers, all lawyers remain governed by one set of
broad (and necessarily high-level) set of principles and conduct rules. This makes certain
assumptions about the way that rules operate to govern behaviour. Broad principles may
appear to have the beneﬁt of being shaped at the local level to suit the needs of a diverse
legal profession; but this may also mean that, unless expressed as speciﬁc rules to be
obeyed, they are unlikely to have any real, direct purchase. There also comes a point
where principles are so abstract that instead of operating deontologically (as duties),
they develop a very strong dispositional or ‘virtue-like’ dimension that needs to be instilled
(in situations where, as we will come to show, the environment of large corporate law
simply does not operate in a way to instil or reinforce those virtues, except that of the
primacy of the client interest).
43SRA, ‘The Handbook – Principles’ (Version 15, 2015), para 2.2.
44See <http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/1990/1/cepler_working_paper_9_2015.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016.
45The current SRA Handbook is more than 400 pages long. Despite this, the regulator says it takes an ‘outcomes-focused’
approach to regulation. The length of the Handbook is under review as part of a wider review of how the SRA regulates
solicitors. On this, see the paper by Crispin Passmore in this Special Issue.
46On this distinction, and more generally, see: J Loughrey, ‘The Perils of (Meta)regulating Large Law Firms in England and
Wales’ (2016) 19 (2) Legal Ethics (forthcoming).
47See <https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/competence-statement.page> accessed 10 May 2016. It is perhaps important to
note that the requirements on ethics in the Competence Statement are not further elaborated on, or explained, by
the SRA.
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Methodology
While the moral philosophical work on lawyers’ ethics over the last ﬁve decades has been
voluminous,48 the associated empirical ﬁeld on lawyers in large law ﬁrms is much
smaller.49 This is despite the fact that, in England and Wales, one-ﬁfth of all solicitors
work for the largest City ﬁrms,50 and the turnover of just the top 10 law ﬁrms accounts
for more than one-third of the turnover of the entire legal services sector.51 The lack of
empirical work is also striking given the acceptance that corporations, as clients, pose
the potential for greater societal harm than individuals and have ‘limited [ethical] motiv-
ations’ in the form of aggressive pursuit of proﬁts (and so the ethics of their lawyers might
require close attention).52 Large ﬁrms thus represent a numerically signiﬁcant and socially
economically important, but largely overlooked, site of study. What other qualitative work
does exist on the ethics of lawyers in large ﬁrms is primarily focused on litigation lawyers
rather than corporate lawyers,53 and/or tends to be small scale.54 The wider scholarship on
legal ethics continues to point to the need to explore the particular contexts in which par-
ticular lawyers practise.55 Here, one of the many interesting ﬁndings from our work (dis-
cussed further below) is that the ‘zealous lawyer’ paradigm, considered classic among law
ﬁrm litigators, is also widespread among corporate lawyers in large ﬁrms.
In total, we have spoken with 135 transactional lawyers, compliance ofﬁcers for legal
practice and others,56 from 30 top 100 law ﬁrms operating in the UK, as ranked by the
trade publication Legal Business.57 All but two law ﬁrms in the top 100 were asked to
48Including in relation to corporate lawyers. See, for example: Joan Loughrey, Corporate Lawyers and Corporate Governance
(Cambridge University Press, 2012).
49There is a relatively large body of empirical work on in-house lawyers. It is not, however, our intention for this piece to be
comparative. For a review of this empirical work, and a comparison of private practice and in-house lawyers, see R Moor-
head and V Hinchly, ‘Professional Minimalism? The Ethical Consciousness of Commercial Lawyers’ (2015) 42 Journal of
Law and Society 387.
50Law Society, Annual Statistical Report 2014 (London, April 2014) 11.
51See <http://www.thelawyer.com/news/uk-200-2013/> accessed 10 May 2016; and Law Society, Legal Services Forecasts
(Law Society, 2014) 3.
52Pepper (2015) (n 29) 1131. See further: JA McMorrow and LM Scheuer, ‘The Moral Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer’
(2010) 60 Catholic University Law Review 275, 277ff.
53See, for example: K Kirkland, ‘Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism’ (2005) University of Memphis Law
Review 631 (here, of 22 lawyers interviewed, 17 were litigators); and D Frenkel, ‘Ethics: Beyond the Rules – Questions and
Possible Responses’ (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review 875 (interviews with 19 litigators in large ﬁrms).
54For example, Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49) interviewed nine private practice lawyers in large ﬁrms for their project along-
side a number of other in-house lawyers; and Grifﬁths-Baker undertook 17 interviews for her work on conﬂicts of interest
in large ﬁrms – although it is not clear, from the Methodology appendix to her work, as to the practice area of those who
took part in her interviews; see J Grifﬁths-Baker, Serving Two Masters: Conﬂicts of Interest in the Modern Law Firm (Blooms-
bury Publishing, 2002). There are, of course, much larger bodies of qualitative empirical work on lawyers in other practice
settings who also consider legal ethics. For example, in the mid-1960s, Jerome Carlin undertook more than 800 interviews
with a cross-section of lawyers in New York City on lawyers’ ethics – see JE Carlin, Lawyers’ Ethics: A Survey of the New York
City Bar (Russell Sage Foundation, 1966). A decade later, John Heinz and Edward Laumann (n 41) interviewed more than
700 lawyers for their study of the Chicago Bar. More recently, in their study of 106 Canadian corporate lawyers, Ronit
Dinovizter, Hugh Gunz and Sally Gunz explored complex and nuanced, direct and indirect, examples of ‘client
capture’ (in which corporate lawyers became in a variety of ways beholden to their clients), but their direct engagement
with how such capture impacts on lawyers’ ethics was rather thin – see: R Dinovitzer, H Gunz and S Gunz, ‘Unpacking
Client Capture: Evidence from Corporate Law Firms’ (2014) 1 Journal of Professions and Organization 99; and R Dinovitzer,
H Gunz and S Gunz, ‘Reconsidering Lawyer Autonomy: The Nexus Between Firm, Lawyer, and Client in Large Commercial
Practice’ (2014) 51 American Business Law Journal 661.
55L Mather and LC Levin, ‘Why Context Matters’ in LC Levin and L Mather (eds), Lawyers in Practice: Ethical Decision Making
in Context (University of Chicago Press, 2012); Kirkland (n 53) 632; R Moorhead and V Hinchly (n 49) 393.
56Compliance Ofﬁcers for Legal Practice are a creation of the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). They are responsible for
ensuring that processes are in place to enable the law ﬁrm, its managers and employees, and anyone who has any inter-
est in the ﬁrm to comply with the SRA Handbook.
57<http://www.legalbusiness.co.uk/index.php/analysis/4615-lb100-2015> accessed 10 May 2016.
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participate.58 Our project operated in three distinct phases. This paper primarily concerns
just one of those phases,59 and draws on interviews with 57 transactional (i.e. non-litiga-
tion) lawyers that took place between December 2014 and September 2015.60 For conven-
ience, we use the shorthand ‘corporate lawyers’ in the rest of this paper to cover the various
ﬂavours of transactional lawyer who took part (which included leveraged, structured, and
project ﬁnance lawyers; ﬁnancial services lawyers; and public and private mergers and
acquisition lawyers) and to make clear that our focus is on lawyers in large corporate
law ﬁrms.
Interviews took place either in person (at the lawyer’s ofﬁce) or over the telephone, and
lasted between 30 and 61 minutes. The majority were over 50 minutes long. Interview sche-
dules provided a series of themes and questions to be explored in a semi-structured dialogue
between interviewer and interviewee.61 These schedules included, among other matters,
direct questions on ethics, ethical training, client advice on ethics and ethics in the work-
place. These are set out more fully in the following sections. We also deployed a number
of vignettes (hypothetical scenarios involving potential ethical dilemmas). As Moorhead
andHinchly note, such vignettes are one way of mitigating risks associated with ‘error, omis-
sion…memory lapse [and]… response biases’ in these sorts of elite interviews.62 Once
completed, the interviews were professionally transcribed, coded and analysed. Below, we
use anonymised identiﬁers to show the range of interviews from which we draw.63
Gaining access to elites for interview purposes can be challenging, and this is particu-
larly true of lawyers.64 Our approach was to send an initial email to the senior partner and/
or ofﬁce managing partner and/or head of corporate/ﬁnance, and then two further follow-
up emails.65 Some ﬁrms agreed to participate on the basis that we provided them with
anonymised, follow-up benchmarking of how they compared to other ﬁrms. We were
happy to do this. We make no claims that the data on which we draw is representative;
it is not. But it does offer an important and powerful insight into how the transactional
lawyers we spoke with think about the topics we are interested in, and (as we have
already set out) in an area where comparable empirical work is scarce.
The ethical lawyer
Our interviews included speciﬁc questions on ethics. We began by asking our interviewees
this question: ‘How you would describe an ethical lawyer?’. This was both intentionally
58The two who were not asked do not do any transactional work.
59We make some small cross-reference later in the paper to the ﬁrst phase of interviews (with 53 partners and Compliance
Ofﬁcers for Legal Practices) that touched on the nature of the lawyer–client relationship.
60When ﬁrms were contacted, we set out that our preference was to speak with lawyers in the ﬁrm’s corporate and ﬁnance
teams. Different ﬁrms sourced interviewees differently, and forwarded on our call for participation differently. In some
ﬁrms, for example, real estate lawyers who did primarily transactional work also came forward. Everyone we spoke with
engaged in transactional work. In total, we spoke with 23 partners, two counsel, 29 associates, and three trainee solicitors.
61Schedules available on request.
62Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49) 395.
63The markers are made up of three parts: ﬁrst, C or F (Corporate or Finance); then P, C, A or T (Partner, Counsel, Associate,
or Trainee); and then a number. So CP2 is the second corporate partner we spoke with, and FA7 is the seventh ﬁnance
associate.
64S Vaughan, ‘Elite and Elite-lite Interviewing: Managing our Industrial Legacy’ in A Franklin and P Blyton (eds), Researching
Sustainability: A Guide to Social Science Methods, Practice and Engagement (Earthscan, 2011).
65The reason for the multiple use of ‘and/or’ is that it was not always possible to easily identify the relevant role holders in
the various ﬁrms.
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broad and intentionally referred to a hypothetical third party. Our aim was to be able to
contrast how our interviewees would describe the hypothetical ethical lawyer with how
they acted in their own practices. We might expect that lawyers, if the professional prin-
ciples we discussed above were an important and meaningful dimension of ethicality, to
draw closely on and reference these. As we shall see, they did not. It was fair to say that
our initial question caused many to pause:
How would I describe an ethical lawyer?… that is a very good question… [long pause] Good
job this isn’t a job interview; I wouldn’t be doing very well. (FA1)
The answers we received to this question reﬂected a very broad church. The vast majority
made reference to compliance with the law. Some of these wrapped that compliance with
either acting in the best interests of the client or not doing anything illegal for the client:
Someone who wouldn’t necessarily do everything the client asks them to do, simply because
they are the client. That they would have regard to the regulatory framework, the legal frame-
work, in which they’re operating. (CC1)
The vast majority of our interviewees referenced the ‘rules’ and ‘lawfulness’ and the ‘regu-
latory framework’ (i.e. not going outside the bounds of the law), but nothing about what
the professional principles might require. Around one-third of the responses referenced,
in some form, values or morality. Some of these were rather expansive:
I think somebody who clearly has a set of core values that they profess to abide by, and those
don’t necessarily have to be values that have been impressed upon them by external regu-
lation or the ﬁrm that they act for. They can simply be personal values… So forget the
SRA, forget the law; ultimately, deep down inside, what are those things that you as an indi-
vidual just will or will not do? (CP5)
Of those who referenced values or morals, honesty and integrity were commonly cited
principles.66 A handful talked about the ethical lawyer adhering to the spirit or purpose
of the law (in the vein of Simon, discussed above). Women lawyers were more likely
than men to frame their responses in terms of values or character. As such, and
drawing on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development,67 one might suggest that the
women corporate lawyers had a greater ethical disposition than their male peers.
However, our sample size of 57 was relatively small compared with the wider population,
and the proportion of women to men (25:75) makes drawing stronger gender-related con-
clusions challenging.
This corporate partner spoke about the ethical lawyer being alive to the consequences of
the advice they were giving:
Somebody who is conscious of, alive to, the morality of the situation, of the wider community
interest – by which I mean the interests of the wider ﬁrm and the community in which we
operate, both business and non-business. I think that an ethical lawyer ought to be worrying,
frankly, about the advice that they give and the reasons why they’re being asked to give it and
the consequences of that advice, on a daily basis; if not consciously, then subconsciously.
(CP19)
66This reﬂects how the in-house and private practice interviewees responded to questions by Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49,
395) as to what ﬁrst came to their mind as ethics in legal practice.
67For an overview of this area, see: J Rest, MJ Bebeau, and SJ Thoma, Postconventional Moral Thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian
Approach (Psychology Press, 1999).
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Later, however, we will see this same partner talk about the lack of ‘black and white’ (as
regards ethicality) when working for clients in potentially challenging areas (tobacco,
animal testing, etc). Indeed, what is so interesting about the responses to the hypothetical
‘ethical lawyer’ question is the wide range of articulations (a good number of which had
space for the inclusion of morals, characters, values, etc), when the way in which these
lawyers spoke about their actual work and their day-to-day real-world lived roles had
almost no space for these matters. Earlier in the interviews we had asked a range of ques-
tions on the role of the corporate lawyer, and on how the interviewees described what they
did. None of those responses included positive references to values or morality. Instead,
they were universally framed within the ‘standard conception’ (i.e. the lawyer pursuing
the client’s interests within the bounds of the law). In fact, some interviewees, without
prompting, had spoken of their role as not including ethical or moral considerations:68
Well, I think of our role as facilitators, and service providers, and they call us in to mitigate
risk; and I don’t think of our role as being kind of ethical or moral or anything like that.
(CA4)
A constraint refrain was the corporate lawyer seeing their role in terms of effecting the
client’s wishes. While some of the partners brought up the notion of the lawyer as
trusted advisor or wise counsellor, most of our interviewees spoke instead of their role
as one of ‘conduit’ [CA4], ‘facilitator’ [CA19] or ‘catalyst’ [CA10]. Since the mid-1990s,
a number of commentators have been lamenting the decline of large law ﬁrm culture,69
a world in which business demands, the ‘eat what you kill culture’ of some ﬁrms and/or
sheer growth are said to be to blame.70 There are those who suggest that the notion of
a corporate/ﬁnance lawyer as a professional exercising professional judgment has all
but disappeared: Hanlon writes of ‘commercialised professionalism’,71 while Boon and
Levin talk of these lawyers as ‘cogs in a machine’.72 While all of our interviewees recog-
nised this shift towards a ‘service provider’ paradigm, only a minority thought it was of
concern.73 Most accepted it as a fait accompli.
Ethical dilemmas in transactional work?
In the ﬁrst interviews we conducted, we had asked for examples of ethical dilemmas that
our interviewees had faced in their own practices. We also asked about the extent to which
ethics was an active part of their thinking processes. It quickly became clear that our inter-
viewees struggled to think of ethical dilemmas they had themselves faced, and that ethics
was, for them, more of a subconscious than conscious matter:
68It is perhaps worth noting here that the interviewees were told, in the email soliciting their participation, that the project
was concerned with a variety of matters and made speciﬁc reference to ethics.
69E Chambliss, ‘Measuring Law Firm Culture’ in Austin Sarat (ed), Law, Politics and Society: Law Firms, Legal Culture and Legal
Practice (Special Issue, 2010).
70M Galanter and WD Henderson, ‘The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm’ (2008) 60 Stan-
ford Law Review 1867; MC Regan, Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer (University of Michigan Press, 2004).
71G Hanlon, Lawyers, the State and the Market: Professionalism Revisited (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998) 123.
72A Boon and J Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England & Wales (2nd edn, Hart Publishing, 2008) 178.
73In the 1960s Talcott Parsons argued that lawyers’ ‘function in relation to clients is by no means only to “give them what
they want” but often to resist their pressures and get them to realise some of the hard facts of their situations, not only
with reference to what they can, even with clever legal help, expect to “get away with” but with reference to what the
law will permit them to do’. T Parsons, ‘A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession’ in Talcott Parsons (ed), Essays in Socio-
logical Theory (Free Press, 1964).
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I: On a day-to-day basis, how often does ethics come to your mind?
R: Not very often, thankfully. I don’t have to ask myself ethical questions very often, I
think.
I: Because you’re not in situations which would… ?
R: I don’t see, or I don’t come across, situations where I need to ask myself or require or it’s
desirable to ask myself the question or to raise any points of ethics. I don’t remember
coming across an ethical sort of situation as such. (FA8)
It was challenging for the corporate lawyers we interviewed to see ethical considerations
arising in their own ﬁeld. A different associate had commented: ‘maybe that’s just the
nature of the work’ (FA3). A number contrasted what they did as corporate lawyers
with lawyers acting in other areas (where ethical issues were, the corporate lawyers
thought, more likely to arise: ‘take litigation… ’ [FP1]). So, for example, this managing
partner told us:
I don’t want to kind of diminish the importance of it, but at the same time, you know, it’s not
like we are doing Children Act applications or, you know, something of that nature. It’s far
more from a business focus. (MP1)
In this response, reﬂective of the broader sample, we may be seeing a form of moral dis-
tancing: a view that matters between large, sophisticated parties (company A buying
company B, bank C lending to company D) simply do not engage questions of ethics.
One trainee, in discussing the connection between what the lawyer did in their ofﬁce
and what the end result was in the real world, said to us: ‘often… you’re telling
stories, that’s a good way of putting it, so you’re telling the stories of companies and
when you tell the stories the entities within them can come ﬁctionalised to you in
some sense, just the nature of a story’ (CT3). These responses may also indicate
forms of moral inattentiveness, in which those who are unable to recognise moral
aspects in everyday experiences may be less likely to recall and report on morally rel-
evant behaviour.74 This ﬁnance associate spoke of how her geographic distance from a
matter inﬂuenced how she felt about it:
It’s those when you are personally very aware of the impact that the project is having
where I think it resonates particularly with you. Although it might sound a terrible
thing to say, but it is true, when you’re doing a motorway ﬁnancing in Lithuania you
are necessarily that far removed from the debate because the press isn’t in English
often and you don’t know the people and so on. So, I think it’s necessarily the UK projects
that are affecting people that you are personally friendly with where you are aware of that.
(FA7)
This geographical distancing is interesting given the increasingly global nature of legal
practice for large law ﬁrms whose lawyers may regularly work on matters taking place
thousands of miles from their ofﬁces. If corporate lawyers take the view that their work
does not engage ethical considerations, or distance themselves from the ethics of their
work, then we might argue that that this makes them less sensitive to those ethical con-
siderations as and when they do arise (as indeed they surely will). We come back to
this later.
74S Reynolds, ‘Moral Attentiveness: Who Pays Attention to the Moral Aspects of Life?’ (2008) 93 Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy 1027.
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The environmental pollution dilemma
Given the lack of concrete examples offered up to us by our interviewees, we decided to
introduce hypothetical ethical scenarios to the interviews and to ask our interviewees
how they would respond. Similar scenarios have been used in other work on corporate
and in-house lawyers.75 One dilemma concerned the potential for environmental pol-
lution linked to a company purchase: ‘Imagine your client is buying a company in a devel-
oping country, the target is in compliance with all local environmental law, but the laws
there actually are not very effective, and you know that post-purchase, the company’s
going to have a signiﬁcant detrimental impact on the environment’.76 Most of our inter-
viewees saw no legal issue with this dilemma (given that the target was in compliance) and
few said they would raise the potential for environmental harm as part of a moral dialogue
with the client:
It’s got nothing to do with my profession, I guess. No. If it’s legal, of course; but no, not over
and above. (CA8)
So all the client cares about is minimising the cost and making the most proﬁt it possibly can,
so I’ll put those objectives ﬁrst and I don’t have any guilt, no! (CP13)
One corporate partner reframed our hypothetical:
I think in that case you would be thinking, if a large UK company is buying that company
then actually that is probably a good thing because they are then going to have reporting obli-
gations going forward and they are likely to clean it up. (CP16)
This is, perhaps, engagement in a form of storytelling (‘And they all lived happily ever
after… ’) which makes the partner more comfortable about what their clients are doing.
Other work has shown that individuals can reframe and construe a situation (here, in a
business-like frame) in which client interest is paramount.77 As such, self-interest triggers
self-deception, which decreases the likelihood that an ethical frame will be adopted.
A number of the interviewees spoke of potential reputational harm to the client if they
bought the target:
So, the target is having a negative impact – yes, I think you would raise it and say, ‘You must
be aware there’s a potential goodwill impact of buying this company’. Yes, I think you would
say that. But that I think, in the circumstance you’ve raised, that is giving advice to say, ‘If you
buy this company and it’s doing this sharp practice this could blow back at you’. And then it
becomes the client’s call as to whether they want to do it. They’re doing nothing illegal, but it
looks very sharp. (CA6)
In a scenario like that where the local laws are not as, you know, to the same standard as the
client’s laws, I think that is more of a sort of reputational issue, a sort of corporate respon-
sibility issue. And we come across this in a lot of – it could be things like human rights, it
could be things like corruption – where laws generally differ; and in those scenarios where
clearly the client would be compliant locally, and there isn’t anything in their own laws as
a buyer that would say, you know, that applies the same standard. We do, or what I do
quite a lot, is say: Look, this is not a legal risk but it is a reputational risk; do you want to
75Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49) 395.
76We used this vignette to explore a situation in which a client is in compliance with the letter of the law but perhaps not its
spirit. This example creates the potential space for an ethical dialogue with the client. We were interested whether that
dialogue took place.
77AE Tenbrunsel and DM Messick, ‘Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-deception in Unethical Behavior’ (2004) 17 Social Justice
Research 223, 233.
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be associated with this company that does this? And in most cases they might come back and
say, ‘Actually, we will still go ahead with the investment, but we are going to put in under-
takings in the document that this is remedied’. That is sort of how I’ve dealt with it. It’s not a
hypothetical scenario; it happens a lot. (CA12)
The idea of the lawyer not being the decision maker was a common part of the responses
to the dilemma:
I don’t really think a legal adviser is there to do the decision making for the client. You can
advise and you can offer different options and permutations in what you think, with your
experience, what might happen, but I think the decision has to be the client’s ﬁnal decision,
so to be a check on their decision making, I think – other than saying, ‘Look, these are your
options, this is what we think’ – I think it would be very difﬁcult to go beyond that threshold.
(CA1)
One of my partners – but at the time was an associate – who had a bit of a reputation for
being a little bit ﬁery, and we had some US client who was over and this particular colleague
sort of had said, for I think about the third time, that they thought the client should do X
rather than Y. This was an associate; and I won’t try the US accent, he [the client] said,
‘I’m the client, I’m allowed to be bleeping stupid if I want to!’. And there’s a balance
between – in the end you are an advisor, you are not a principal. If you want to be the prin-
cipal… you get a lot of inﬂuence here, as we were talking about, but you are not the principal;
and so on some things, you just have to let them do it even if they are wrong. (CP16)
This is a classic liberal view of autonomy and non-interference: if the client has capacity,
let them do it, even it is stupid or wrong. A strong sense of non-accountability (through
not being the decision maker) was also seen in the following dilemma, and is reﬂective of
how the lawyers Moorhead and Hinchly interviewed in their work ‘distanc[ed] themselves
from ethical responsibility’.78
The job losses dilemma
Our second hypothetical concerned the consequences of one large company taking over
another: ‘Imagine you are acting for a company on a public takeover. You know that,
once the takeover is effected, it is likely that 2000 people working for the target will lose
their jobs’. Only one of the interviewees saw this particular scenario as engaging ethical
questions with which they might need to grapple. This sole exception saw the potential
for concern, but said that they (happily) had never come across the situation before.
Most interviewees instead framed their responses in terms of compliance with the relevant
English law and guidance from the Takeover Panel (which would, under various con-
ditions, permit the job losses).
That is not something I would feel terrible about. I think that that’s inherent in M&A. And
that… if the proper procedures are gone through I wouldn’t… it wouldn’t… it wouldn’t
cause me to lose sleep over that. (CA16)
This associate framed her response in terms of distance and a decision maker/non-
decision maker divide:
If it was overt and they sat there in a meeting and I had a client turn around and say,
‘Obviously when we buy it and we’re going to sack everybody’, I probably would feel a bit
78Ibid 396.
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bad. But it wouldn’t stop me doing the deal, because that’s what I’m employed to do by [my
law ﬁrm]. Which makes me horrible, doesn’t it! Oh my god! If that’s what they’ve decided
commercially they’re going to do, then they’re going to get legal advice from somewhere
to do it. And we’re not physically the ones making people redundant. We’re just facilitating
the transaction; which somebody would do for them, whether it’s us or someone else. We’re
basically providing a service, which is legal advice. We’re not getting involved in any of the
ethics; we’re not making anybody resign or sacking them or anything. (CA7)
This is a powerful example of the rationalising process (based on drawing careful infer-
ences, of course) and how instrumental,79 and expressive,80 frames come into play.
What was clear in the responses to this hypothetical scenario, and the responses to the
other scenarios, was the principle of non-accountability that sits at the heart of the stan-
dard conception: the idea that lawyers cannot, and should not, be held accountable for the
actions of their clients. A number of interviewees framed this in terms of the lawyer who
was advising the client not being the decision maker whomade the thing happen and it not
being their place to supplant or interfere with the decision maker’s autonomy. We return
to this below. Recent work in the ﬁeld of social psychology has shown how people who
obey orders may subjectively experience their actions as closer to passive movements
than fully voluntary actions.81 Here, because the corporate lawyer is acting on instructions,
they may see less responsibility for what they do.
The ethics of client actions
We also asked our interviewees about the extent to which they reﬂected on the conse-
quences of decisions their clients had taken. The vast majority undertook none of this
reﬂection, and framed their views along classic lawyer neutrality lines (as set out above,
one of the other principles of the standard conception approach). This ﬁnance associate
said:
It’s not for me to judge whether my oil and gas client should or shouldn’t be doing business in
Venezuela. The fact is, they are; and they’ve asked me for help doing it. It’s also not for me to
judge whether the Venezuelan environmental standards are despicably low and that the
Venezuelan government wants to make them weaker, thereby meaning that this awful
trade will damage the environment in Venezuela unnecessarily. If I was king of the universe,
I’d make a lot of changes. I can’t judge that for my clients. (FA2)
Some interviewees saw how others might expect them to be concerned, but were clear that
they were in fact not:
I: The kind of transactions you work on, do you ever think about the consequences of the
decisions that your clients take?
R: [Laughing] Probably not! No, is the honest answer. We just get the deals done; get the
next one in. You probably want me to say something different there; but no, we don’t.
Thinking about it, I probably should feel quite guilty about that. I guess you just get so
tied up in the deal, and so kind of we’re here to do what our clients want us to do, we’re
79That is, ‘If that’s what they’ve decided commercially they’re going to do then they’re going to get legal advice from some-
where to do it’; ‘It’s legal; it’s going to happen anyway’; ‘All that will happen if I don’t do it is that a competitor will get the
work’.
80That is, ‘I’m not actually making these people redundant; I’m just facilitating a transaction, which is the service I’ve been
hired for’.
81EA Caspar, JF Christensen, A Cleeremans and P Haggard, ‘Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain’
(2016) 26 Current Biology 585.
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not here to get involved and get personally upset about things; if we don’t advise them,
somebody else will – and that will be our competitors. So, no, I don’t. (CA7)
What did keep the interviewees up at night was wondering about whether they had advised
their clients properly on the law, or whether their clients were going to take the course of
action their lawyers had suggested for them. Where ethical considerations led to sleepless
nights, these reﬂected the personal histories of the interviewees (i.e. when client decisions
had impacted on them in very real terms and the moral distance between what they did as
lawyers and the consequences of their client’s actions narrowed). For example, the parents
of one lawyer had lost their jobs after a merger; another lawyer randomly came to face to
face at a party with a man who, unknown to him, was about to lose his job because of the
deal she was working on. As with the example of motorway ﬁnancing in Lithuania, these
instances raise questions about empathy and corporate lawyers.
Some of the moral philosophers who toe the ‘standard conception’ line argue that
lawyers have agentic power to exercise moral discretion at the point in time at which
they become lawyers: nobody forces them to choose that career path and so, having
made the choice to become a lawyer, that lawyer then doesn’t get to judge their clients.
This form of rationalisation was seen in some of the interviewees:
Can you feel uncomfortable about the knowledge that if you crash these two businesses
together there’s going to be some fallout with people dropping off the cliff? Yes, you’re
aware of it. I guess I’ve got pretty cynical/hardnosed about that over the years, that’s business
… if I felt so strongly about obligations to keep as many people in work as is humanly poss-
ible at the detriment of proﬁt and running a proﬁtable business, I wouldn’t be doing the job
I’m doing now, I’d probably be a human rights lawyer or something like that. So I’ve made
my bed in that context and I lie in it pretty comfortably. (CP4)
Again, many of our interviewees were at pains to tell us that they were not the decision
makers. They simply advised and facilitated. Many also thought it would be inappropriate
to link lawyers to the actions of their clients because the lawyers only saw one small piece
of the overall puzzle of which the client had control. Given the increasing packaging of
small parts of a major transaction among a panel of ﬁrms and/or alternative services pro-
vides (what is often referred to as ‘unbundling’),82 this may be an increasingly important
way of corporate lawyers avoiding responsibility for the actions of their clients.
This corporate partner articulated one aspect of Dare’s approach to legal ethics83 –
namely that while we live in a pluralistic society that allows a variety of viewpoints to
ﬂower, the law takes one approach or another (with which some people may nevertheless
still disagree):
We don’t any more, but we used to act for one of the big tobacco companies, going back in
time – and certainly, going back in time, I did a small amount of work when I was a junior
lawyer for one of the animal testing companies… so they are issues which I’ve thought about
in my career. I think that very often, the morality around those businesses is not necessarily
black and white. The advice that we are asked to provide is advice which all businesses are
entitled to ask for and I’ve never seen a problem with providing advice to the best of my
ability to companies which are undertaking activities which some people might see as
morally dubious, because I don’t think that the situation is always black and white by any
82See Allen & Overy, Unbundling the Market: The Appetite for New Legal Services Business Models (London, 2014).
83Dare (n 6).
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means, and a business that one person might see as being morally dubious another might see
as being essential to the forward progression of science or technology or whatever it might be.
(CP19)
Here, while some people might take issue with animal testing, or the sale of cigarettes, or
the use of certain tax structures, each of those matters are legal and not something for the
lawyers to take a view on. Indeed, many of those who participated in the interviews had in
fact acted for such animal-testing and tobacco companies, and also for oil and gas clients.
What was interesting, however, was that a number of the interviewees, despite acting (very
happily) for company X or Y (which others might have moral concerns about), still had
their own very personal, highly individualised redlines, things they simply would not do
for their clients. We have decided to call these personal redlines ‘gorilla exceptions’, for
reasons that will soon become apparent.
Gorilla exceptions
The vast majority of our interviewees clove strongly to the principles of neutrality and
non-accountability: it was not their job to judge what their clients did (as long as such
conduct was legal), and lawyers should not (for a variety of reasons) be held accountable
for the actions of their clients. In his interview, this ﬁnance partner was absolutely clear
that his job was not to judge the actions of his clients, that his clients could engage in what-
ever business they chose within the limits of the law. But he went on:
In spite of everything that I’ve said so far, I do have a very strong view about environmental
protection and animals in particular. I have a very deep-seated and strongly felt view about
preservation of wildlife. If somebody came to me and said, ‘We’ve got this amazing mandate
to build a something on the mountains of DRC that currently are home to 500 gorillas’, I
might struggle a bit with that. (FP2)
Later in the interview, the same ﬁnance partner spoke about his ﬁrm doing defence work
for tobacco companies:
R: Funny thing is, I’ve got absolutely no qualms about that [tobacco defence] whatsoever.
I: Different sources of angst…
R: Take the money and go with it. (FP2)
This corporate associate, in a different law ﬁrm, also had a soft spot for gorillas:
The public company work is quite a pertinent issue; I mean [in] the public markets, obviously
people lose real money, companies go to the wall, companies fail. I’ve worked on extractive
industries, and then I’ve worked on IPOs where you read the prospectus or the circular or the
commission document and there’s bits on the environment where they say ‘Oh well, in this
bit of jungle that we’re going to raze there’s a type of gorilla that only lives there, so what we’re
going to do is we’re going to catch them all and we’re just going to move them 100 miles
south and they’ll be ﬁne, they won’t notice the difference’. And you think… That really
upset me, yeah, that one did upset me. So yeah, it does penetrate; but I suppose I just sort
of try not to focus on it too much. (CA9)
However, his moral concern only seemed to extend to gorillas, and not to humans. Later in
the interview, the same associate said:
If company A is acquiring company B and identiﬁes that they’ve got duplication in the hos-
pitality team and the payroll team and a few people lose their jobs, right, that’s not my role to
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advise them on whether or not they should be doing that… But it’s a commercial decision
that that needs to happen, perhaps, and that’s not ever a decision I would be involved in.
(CA9)
A different corporate associate (CA20) told us he had turned down a secondment to a
tobacco company because of his personal beliefs about the harms from tobacco, but
was happy to do work for automotive clients which he knew had signiﬁcant deleterious
impacts on the environment. This corporate partner, who had earlier said that he did
not care if his clients’ solar panels were made using slave labour, went on to say:
There are some things that I wouldn’t, you know, I wouldn’t – I’d be uncomfortable with
advising, like a gambling company. I’d be uncomfortable, I wouldn’t advise a gambling
company; I wouldn’t advise somebody doing porn or, you know, that kind of … I mean,
I’ve no problem with tobacco or alcohol; but there are just some things, you know – well,
I just think I’m not going to do that. And it’s probably a product of my character and personal
beliefs as much as anything else. (CP8)
It struck us that we have corporate lawyers who strongly feel that it is not for them to judge
the actions of their clients, save when those actions confront and contest certain, often very
speciﬁc, closely held issues for the given lawyer. These sorts of personal redlines were rela-
tively common. If these are forms of conscientious objection, they are very selective indeed
and, as we will see in the following section, reﬂect a rather odd parsing of one client (whose
actions are acceptable) from another (whose actions are unacceptable).
Saying ‘no’ to clients, and withdrawing from acting
With all of the interviewees we discussed the extent to which they did, or felt obliged to,
say ‘no’ to the clients because of concerns as to the course of action the client proposed. We
also talked about how often our interviewees declined to act for certain clients (for what-
ever reason). We were interested in these topics because the ethical approaches of both the
standard conception and the morally activist philosophers speak about the power of saying
‘no’ and walking away. Luban argues that his morally activist approach ‘may create
awkward moments of saying “No” to clients and partners on a more frequent (but not
super frequent) basis than lawyers have to do now’.84 Equally, Freedman and Pepper,
both proponents of the ‘standard conception’ of legal ethics, suggest that the standard con-
ception approach allows for the exercise of moral judgement by lawyers as it permits the
law to reject or withdraw from acting for the client.85 Wilkins suggests that both refusing
and agreeing to act for clients carry ‘moral signiﬁcance’.86 Our data, however, suggest that
saying ‘no’, walking away and having ‘awkward’ conversations happen only infrequently
in real-world corporate practice. One corporate partner told us:
It’s ultimately the clients [who] make the decisions [as] to what advice they take. If they are
doing something that you think is illegal, or something that you might even stop if you think
it’s unethical, then we wouldn’t do it, we wouldn’t advise them. And the great advantage of
84Luban (2010) (n 19) 8.
85See MH Freedman, ‘Personal Responsibility in a Professional System’ (1978) 27 Catholic University Law Review 1919; and
S Pepper (n 9) 630–32. See further: M Freedman and A Smith, Understanding Lawyers Ethics (4th edn, Carolina Academic
Press, 2010) 69–72.
86Wilkins (n 33) 1039.
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being an out-house lawyer has always been that at the end of the day you can say to the client
‘I’m sorry, I don’t want to act for you any more’. (CP17)
However, in 25 years of practice, she had only ever once said to a client that she no longer
wanted to act for them because of what the client was planning to do (at which point, the
client changed their mind). But this partner also acknowledged that she was in a ‘privileged
position’ in a well-respected law ﬁrm that was careful about which clients they took on, and
which operated a traditional lockstep (which, she said, reduced the incentive to keep any one
client of any one partner).87 It struck us that saying ‘no’ or refusing to act were nuclear deter-
rents: powerful and potent in theory, but unused and somewhat limp in practice. This
exchange was typical, and replicated in various forms throughout most of our interviews:
R: Maybe you do get to the point where there are some clients, or some jurisdictions, or
some industries, where you don’t work or don’t want to work.
I: Has that ever happened to you? Have you ever had to say ‘no’ to a client, or have you
seen a partner saying ‘no’ to a client and walking away?
R: I haven’t personally, and I haven’t seen it. (CA18)
The ‘nuclear deterrent’ would only be exercised in extreme cases – for example, around
fraud or clear illegality, or because of the highly personal ‘gorilla exceptions’ discussed
in the previous section. What came out was a belief among those we interviewed that
the ﬁrms that they worked for would not take on certain types of client, so the need to
exercise the nuclear deterrent of saying ‘no’ or walking away never came up.
I can’t think of too many examples, though, where we would resign from a mandate, although
there probably are, and we would always think about it; but if we were asked by a client to
invest in … in, I don’t know… I mean it’s not as if we’re not going to act for people in
the arms industry, or things like that! (CP12)
What is interesting about this quote, and the ‘gorilla exceptions’, are the ways in corporate
lawyers parse various types of client: oil and gas clients are better than or different from
tobacco clients; tobacco clients are better than or different from animal testing clients;
animal testing clients are better than or different from arms industry clients, and so on.
Such highly differentiated moral relativism suggests that the standard conception
approach has, for our interviewees, a number of fact-speciﬁc exceptions. Their general
apathy about the ethics of their own work, and the work of their clients, gives way in
highly individualised contexts (a ‘99 times out of 100 role morality’ approach). This
suggests that their commitment to respect for the law as a neutral ﬁeld in which their
clients play may be somewhat limited.88 We also question whether those we spoke to
drew on their own ‘gorilla exceptions’ to persuade themselves both that they did in fact
set some moral boundaries to their work, and that there were elements of choice and
moral agency to what they did as lawyers. As such, the ‘gorilla exceptions’ may be used
as a protection for ethical apathy, a kind of false claim to ethicality. What we also see is
87Lockstep is a system of remuneration in law ﬁrms, and other organisations, which is based solely on rank (and not, say, on
merit or performance) – for example, all those made partner in 2016 are rewarded in the same way. It operates in contrast
to the ‘eat what you kill’ system of remuneration in which individual proﬁts are directly tied to individual billings. The
power of lockstep has also been shown in relation to more general lawyer–client power relations in large ﬁrms. See C Coe
and S Vaughan, ‘Independence, Representation and Risk’ (Report for the SRA, October 2015).
88Here, Bradley Wendel argues that lawyers only have a conscientious objection where they have ‘such a fundamental
moral disagreement that it essentially rises to the level of a conﬂict of interest.’ See Wendel (2010) (n 10) 125.
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that the decision frames of the lawyers spoken to are simultaneously shaped by and shape
the institutional context, and that this context takes a highly rule-based approach: it
assumes that new staff learn appropriate behaviours by being appropriately socialised
or enculturated by the ﬁrm, and that these processes are supported by hiring the ‘right
sort of person’ in the ﬁrst place (which also speaks to recruitment practices).
Ethical infrastructures in large ﬁrms
We were interested in the extent to which ethics was the subject of training and education
programmes in large ﬁrms, and where or how the ethics of corporate lawyers was assessed
by their ﬁrms. Other work, largely in the business ﬁeld, has discussed the importance of
the extent to which organisations have an infrastructure that protects and promotes ethi-
cality.89 From our interviews, three matters struck us as of importance. First, ‘ethics’ train-
ing took place, but this was by and large focused on the speciﬁc rules of the SRAHandbook
(conﬂicts of interest, anti-money laundering etc).90 These quotes, from lawyers in three
different ﬁrms, are reﬂective of the wider sample:
Maybe at the beginning we had to have a risk management training, but I don’t think we ever
have speciﬁc ethics training. We have a ton of practical skills training, but nothing to do with
ethics. (CA19)
We have quite a lot of training here. For example, right now they’re talking about that you
need to know the rules and regulations around bribery and taking gifts for clients and accept-
ing gifts, client entertainment, that type of thing. (FA4)
There’s no ethics training in gen[eral]… but then, there would be like… you know, like
money-laundering training and… competition stuff. Like, anti-competitive stuff. But not
speciﬁcally ethics. (CA16)
The recurrent focus is on conduct rules, illegality and risk management. Only a handful of
ﬁrms engaged their lawyers in debates about principles (instead of rules) and the wider
ethics of what they and their clients were doing.91 This is striking, and of serious
concern, given that the SRA Competence Statement (discussed above) sets out that all qua-
liﬁed solicitors should be able to ‘recognise ethical issues and exercise effective judgment in
addressing them’ and ‘understand and apply the ethical concepts which govern their role
and behaviour as a lawyer’.92 Where ethics training (rule speciﬁc, or wider) took place, it
seemed focused largely on those at the lower end of the scale. One corporate partner told
us that ethics training was given at his ﬁrm to trainees and to new partners. When we
asked why the same training was not also compulsory for more senior partners, he said:
‘I mean, I think it’s more that you shouldn’t need to be told’ (CP17). This managing
partner interestingly framed the same issue as one of control:
We can certainly have a, you know, signiﬁcant inﬂuence with junior lawyers. In terms of how
the more senior lawyers behave, and, you know, it’s not just training, but it’s behaviour and
all those things. (MP1)
89See, for example: L Treviño, N den Nieuwenboer and JJ Kish-Gephart, ‘(Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations’ (2014) 65
Annual Review of Psychology 635.
90Our ﬁndings provide further support for what Moorhead and Hinchly found in their earlier study (n 49, 403): ‘Some
private practice ﬁrms did have some infrastructure [here, training in particular] for taking ethics matters more seriously
but an ethical culture tended to be assumed rather than actively fostered’.
91We were told, for example, that training would be given not only on what the lawyer would be required to do in Situation
X to be in compliance with the SRA Handbook, but also what might be the ‘right’ thing to do in that situation.
92<https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/competence-statement.page> accessed 10 May 2016.
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The second matter of note was how few ﬁrms engaged with issues of ethics as part of their
recruitment and retention practices. Interviewees from only two (of 30) ﬁrms told us they
asked would-be trainee solicitors in interview to respond to ethical scenarios:
We give them a scenario, and I did one probably only a couple of months ago, and I think it
had things like, ‘You’re approached by a potential client and they are conducting animal
testing in Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka has very limited regulations around animal testing, so
it’s committed in that jurisdiction but in 150 other jurisdictions what is happening there
would be unlawful. What are the considerations before you take on this client?’. Yeah,
there’s a lot more around the case study than that, but that’s an ethical piece in there, so
we absolutely test people on the way in. (CP12)
In our interviews with the trainees, we do put ethical questions in, for example, and in a joint
venture scenario. And we give them the scenario where it’s a joint venture, so these parties are
going to be working together for the next 20 years or whatever. You see a provision the day
before signing that is not consistent with your client’s instructions but actually allows you to
screw the other side completely, and this could be really valuable in the future; what do you
do? And that is quite interesting. (CP11)
Look at how CP12 frames the issue: ‘ … considerations before you take on this client’
(our emphasis). This strikes us as a question primarily about risk management. We
would be keen to know what would happen to the hypothetical would-be trainee
who said, ‘I’m sorry, but I’m adamantly against animal testing, so I wouldn’t work
for this client’ (although we can guess that that might be the end of the milk round
for them).
It was not clear to us that ethics formed part of the assessment of those seeking pro-
motion to partnership in any of the participating ﬁrms, and only one lawyer told us
that ethics was a speciﬁc part of the ﬁrm’s annual associate appraisal processes:
I don’t think you would really use that word [ethics], speciﬁcally, no. I mean, it’s on our
appraisal forms. ‘Have you considered ethics and the risk management?’ and things like
that. You know? And then you… every year you just say, ‘Yes, I have’. (CA16)
This quote suggests that, although ethics is present in that ﬁrm’s appraisal documentation,
at least one of that ﬁrm’s lawyers treats its presence as no more than a box-ticking exercise.
This is contrary to the reﬂective approach to continuing competence (what was once
known as continuing professional development) taken by the SRA.93 Instead, there was
a belief among a number of interviewees that their ﬁrms only employed ethical lawyers,
who in turn learned from other members of the ﬁrm:
The lateral hires you make and the partners you select and the associates you keep on. They
should naturally absorb from everyone around them that this is an ethical business. We don’t
ram it down people’s throats in a way that some businesses do – we’re not a delicatessen in
Camden, we’re not selling Fairtrade products – but we do things the right way, we treat
people with respect, we comply with the law, we take that seriously. And you expect
people to pick that up by osmosis. (CP18)
This supports other empirical work on corporate lawyers undertaken by Moorhead and
Hinchly, who found that ‘one reason ethical infrastructure is given a low priority
(beyond pressure of work), is the belief that lawyers’ ethics is maintained by recruiting
the “right kinds of people” who come already trained (principally through the [vocational
93<https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/cpd/tool-kit/continuing-competence-toolkit.page> accessed 10 May 2016.
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stage of their legal education]) in their professional obligations’.94 The ‘osmosis’ referred to
here is reminiscent of empirical work undertaken by Kirkland on litigators in large law
ﬁrms.95 Drawing on Jackall,96 she shows that the norms lawyers choose to deploy in
their day-to-day lives depend on the norms other lawyers around and above them also
deploy (a phenomenon Jackall labels ‘looking up and looking around’).97 However, and
somewhat surprisingly, we did not ﬁnd strong evidence for the conclusions reached by
Nelson and by Kirkland that law ﬁrm partners play a ‘crucial role’ in setting the ﬁrm’s
ethical norms and ‘creating the ideology that rationalises those norms’.98 This is
perhaps something worthy of further exploration.
The ethical environment of large law ﬁrms
Our interviews also included ‘water-cooler’ questions on ethics: that is, on the extent to
which (and how) our interviewees actively engaged in informal ethical conversations
with other lawyers inside their own ﬁrms. Existing social psychology literature suggests
that learning happens via informal norms through processes of imitation and confor-
mity.99 Haidt draws upon Durkheim to suggest that the primary source of our moral
thinking is our interaction with others, with whom we develop and share norms that
bind us together as ‘moral communities’.100 In other words, ethics are part of a
wider set of learned dispositions that we acquire as part of social interaction with
others and through membership of social groups. Here, Mather and Levin argue that
‘the most powerful normative constraints on lawyers likely stem from their clients,
colleagues, and practice organisations and not from edicts of the organised bar’.101
Most interviewees told us that ‘water-cooler’ ethical conversations were few and far
between:
Not commonly, I think, is the easy way of putting it. We have an ethics committee, obviously.
It’s a philosophy we buy into, and conceptually we buy into it and we would act in a way
which is deemed to be ethical, because ultimately our clients will expect to see that. But to
put my hand on my heart and say [that] actually there is a point on the agenda which
looks at ethics, no there is not, because we are a very business-minded law ﬁrm. I can tell
you for a fact that most of our agendas are KPIs, utilisation, production, recovery rates,
and whether people are working hard enough. That’s just the cold reality of a modern-day
law ﬁrm, I think. (CP3)
On my day-to-day basis, no, I’ve never had a conversation about ethics, until this point!
(CT3)
As in the section above, there was a sense that these conversations were perhaps not
needed because the ﬁrm hired ‘the right sorts of people’,102 who had had the relevant train-
ing on ethics as part of their legal education:
94Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49).
95Kirkland (n 53).
96R Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (Oxford University Press, 1988).
97Ibid 77.
98Kirkland (n 53) 658; R Nelson, Partners with Power (University of California Press, 1988).
99RB Cialdini and NJ Goldstein, ‘Social Inﬂuence: Compliance and Conformity’ (2004) 55 Annual Review of Psychology 591.
100J Haidt, ‘The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology’ (2007) 316 Science 998, 1000.
101Mather and Levin (n 55) 4.
102The same was found by Smigel in his study of Wall Street lawyers in the 1960s; see EO Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer:
Professional Organization Man? (Free Press of Glencoe, 1969).
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I think it’s something again that’s not really talked about, but I think people would know the
difference between acting ethically and unethically. Yes, it’s not something that I’ve ever had
a conversation with anybody about. (CA1)
It’s assumed you learn about it at law school, you follow good examples. I mean, the partners
I work for I would have said are very ethical; and I do act with integrity. (CA9)
Others were of the view that ethics was ‘inherent’ (CP5) in what they did, or ‘in the back-
ground’ (CP21), and so did not need explicit verbalisation. Partners were more likely than
the associates to tell us they had conversations about ethics (with other partners). This cor-
porate partner spoke about how his fellow partners regularly engaged in right/wrong
debates (here, about things people outside his ﬁrm had done), but that he wondered
whether this also extended to his own associates:
I think the question I sometimes ask is: Do we have the discussions internally amongst our
associates of what is wrong and right? Is what we are doing right or wrong? Is what the
client is doing right or wrong? And we do have those discussions; and yet I get the sense
that our associates, certainly my fellow partners, freely engage in those discussions. We
will just pick up on something that has happened in the FT and the ‘wrong or right?’
test arises in the conversation; and if we were part of that transaction, what would we
have done? Maybe there is a lack of interaction, actually, on that from the younger ones.
Maybe I hadn’t really sort of thought about it in any particular sense, but now that you
kind of feed that back to me I wonder if maybe we do need to take a bit more time to reiter-
ate some of that history that gives rise to the way that we – certainly people of my gener-
ation – feel. (CP11)
This partner, and a number of others, spoke about changes in the way in which junior
lawyers are inculcated into the world of lawyering. This played out in a shift from a
mentor-like relationship, where historically the partner had the time to sit with the
junior and talk things through, to the modern, fast-paced, ‘getting the deal done’ approach.
We had some sense that ‘ethics’ was seen as a dirty word – perhaps because it implied
that someone, somewhere, had done something blameworthy:
I don’t think the word ‘ethics’ is used very often, no. Again, I think what sits behind a lot of
conversations we have are ethical concerns, ethical issues. But I think the language people use
is not very often direct in that way. (FA6)
We asked this associate why she thought ethical conversations did not take place in her
practice:
I think people just don’t like to think about them; if you start to think about it, then probably
a lot of people would query doing things. And then also, I guess, a more practical reason
might just be that you’re really pressed for time; so then you’re like, well, let’s just get this
done and who cares about the ethics – because guess what? we’re not going to change it
anyway! – so let’s just do this; if we were here to save lives and do good, then probably we
wouldn’t be here. And amongst the team, even internally, you would never talk about
that, and ‘Oh, I wonder what they’re doing, I wonder if they’re doing things that are, like,
just like killing people or whatever’ – you know, like we’d never talk about that. It’s more
just like… like it’s … we focus very much on the legal stuff, and I don’t think we talk
about the ethics of what we do, ever. (CA19)
Elsewhere in our interviews, we found no real variation between different ﬂavours of
transactional lawyer. However, we did notice that those working in ﬁnancial services regu-
lation were more likely than other types of lawyer to say that they did speak to each other
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about ethical issues. What is unclear is whether this reﬂects the personal predilections of
the ﬁnancial services lawyers we spoke with and/or is driven by changes in ﬁnancial ser-
vices regulation (or, indeed, by something else). Our hypothesis would be that this links to
the narrow view of ‘ethics’ as compliance and dishonesty (fraud), and that there are so
many rules about ﬁnancial services (and thus far more compliance activity going on).
There is also the fact that being accused of ﬁnancial irregularities is enormously socially
stigmatising, especially given the background conditions of ﬁnancial crisis. As such,
ethical consciousness may well reﬂect the particular institutional and social contexts of
the work of the various ﬂavours of corporate lawyer that we spoke with.
Conclusions
I: How would you describe an ethical lawyer?
R: There are going to be levels: you’ve got someone who does the bare minimum, and
someone who is extremely ethical and pushes ethics all the way. I’m assuming you
want something which is in the middle of all of that. An ethical lawyer would be –
no, actually, maybe I would think of someone who was more into pushing the ethics
of the deal and being someone who did worry about that sort of impact on the
country or the end result, and actually looked into it. Because I guess I just don’t
look into it; I just take the deal as face value, [assuming that there] has to be
someone else has thought about it.
I: So, does that mean you’re an unethical lawyer? Or you’re just not a strongly ethical
lawyer?
R: It depends. I wouldn’t say I was unethical. I just don’t push ethics on things. It’s a dif-
ﬁcult one, isn’t it? (FA7)
Taking the deal at ‘face value’, being the lawyer-technician who uses the law to effect his
client’s wishes, and not ‘pushing’ ethics were common themes from our interviews. We
suggest that there is an apathy – a lack of concern or interest – about ethics on the part
of corporate lawyers. This apathy stemmed from various sources. It was linked to assump-
tions about the sorts of client that large law ﬁrms are willing or not willing to act for,103
and assumptions about the ‘right sort of people’ the ﬁrm hired and retained; it was linked
to strong notions of role morality; and it was founded on the classic legal ethics ‘standard
conception’ principles of neutrality and non-accountability. As such, our work provides
empirical support for the claim made by Luban that lawyers ‘commonly act as though
the standard conception characterises their relationship with clients even when the rep-
resentations do not involve the courtroom’.104
In their work comparing the ethics of in-house and private practice lawyers, Moorhead
and Hinchly offer up various forms of ‘ethical minimalism’ seen in their interviews, which
they set out as meaning ‘narrowly drawn ethical consciousness’.105 It is hard to disagree
with their ﬁndings (which, indeed, resonate with our own). However, we are of the
view that the notions of ‘narrowly drawn ethical consciousness’ and ‘minimalism’
perhaps underplay the richness of the social world of corporate lawyers and the processes
through which their sense of ethicality is constructed and maintained (i.e. the dynamic
relationship between structure and agency). In our interviews, and as suggested in work
103Which in turn links to wider social and economic conditions, and ﬁnancial and reputational issues in particular.
104D Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton University Press, 1988) 57.
105Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49) 409.
LEGAL ETHICS 73
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 02
:45
 25
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
by Mark Sargent on the role of in-house lawyers in corporate scandals,106 we saw what he
calls an ‘apparent indifference’ to ethics and what we term ethical apathy.107 It was not that
our lawyers possessed a de minimis form of ethics, or were unable to rationalise problems
from different ethical viewpoints; rather, that they were largely unenthusiastic, disinter-
ested and unconcerned about the ethics of what they and their clients were doing.
Their own moral compasses ‘seemed to disappear into a smog of expediency, rationalis-
ation, wilful blindness and slavish obedience’ to the client;108 one in which self-deception
was bought about by self-interest. The active distancing of our interviewees from the con-
sequences of their clients’ actions (i.e. a suppression of concern as part of this rationalis-
ation) is also consistent with classic understandings of apathy.109
Our view is that conditions of ethical minimalism and working assumptions about the
nature of ethics in the context of corporate law leads to ethical apathy. This is almost a
(sub)ﬁeld/habitus point, to put it in Bourdieusian terms – a way of thinking about how
structures are maintained through practice, and vice versa. In other words, an ethically
minimalist subﬁeld creates and maintains an ethically apathetic habitus. Framing minim-
alism and apathy in these terms helps to highlight the relational and dynamic processes at
work in constructing and maintaining ethicality and legal practices – something often
missing from the work on lawyers and law ﬁrms, even in interpretivist accounts.
The corporate lawyers we spoke with were almost exclusively adamant that the sort of
work they do does not present ethical dilemmas. We agree, to an extent. Corporate
lawyers in large ﬁrms are almost certainly not faced, on a daily basis, with clear and
bright-line instances of ethically questionable conduct. As Luban says, ‘By and large
lawyers do not go frantically through life encountering one moral dilemma after another
like challenges in a video game’.110 However, subtle, dynamic and challenging questions of
ethics are present in much of the work undertaken by these lawyers: issues of independence
and honesty;111 work where the law is uncertain or grey (and the lawyer uses that uncertainty
to their client’s advantage);112 thinking about (and advising on) the consequences of client
decision making;113 conduct between lawyers in the same ﬁrm and with those on the oppo-
site side of the table, and so on. These are all relevant. We were also struck, very vividly, by
the fact that for many of those who had participated, the interview had been the ﬁrst time
they had reﬂected to any real degree on the ethics of what they did. This speaks volumes
for the ethical climates in large law ﬁrms. At the end of the interviews, as we said our good-
byes, a number commented on the cathartic aspects of the interview process:
It’s interesting to talk about things that you don’t often think about. (FC1)
I was a bit stumped by the ethical questions, I must say, because it’s just not really something I
ever need to at least talk about in terms of my job. (FA5)
In this way, our interviews provided a space in which corporate lawyers could begin to
reﬂect on issues of ethics. For some, this space was more disturbing than for others:
106MA Sargent, ‘Lawyers in the Moral Maze’ (2004) 49 Villanova Law Review 867.
107Ibid 871.
108Ibid 871–72.
109L Gardner, D Gilbert and ST Fiske. The Handbook of Social Psychology (Oxford University Press, 1998).
110Luban (2010) (n 19) 18.
111For an account of these issues, see Coe and Vaughan (n 87).
112On ambiguity, see Moorhead and Hinchly (n 49).
113For one concrete example of this, see Kershaw and Moorhead (n 33).
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‘I’m not sure I’ll be able to sleep at night now, Steven!’ (CA7). We are of the view that large
law ﬁrms can, and should, do much more to make space for these ethical dialogues to
happen on a regular basis. These dialogues, we would suggest, need to be framed in
terms of a critical morality that moves lawyers beyond learning ethical rules of conduct
as set by the SRA in its Handbook without an additional critical consideration of their con-
sequences, limitations and possible alternatives.114 Such would in fact be well in line with
how the SRA frames ethical competence in its own Competence Statement.
There is an obvious disconnect between how the SRA, as regulator, views the principles
on which corporate solicitors act (i.e. the SRA has a ﬂowering in its Handbook of multiple
concerns, with the ‘public interest’ as the top trump) and how corporate solicitors in prac-
tice view their roles (i.e. an almost exclusively client-centred, client-ﬁrst approach). If what
we have are lawyers who are apathetic about the ethical issues posed by their own practices
and by their own clients (save for very selective ‘gorilla exceptions’), and if law ﬁrms are
not routinely engaging in training and dialogues on the ethics of lawyering in large ﬁrms,
then there is a risk that those who advise the world’s most powerful organisations are blind
to the potential for ethical failures. This, we would suggest, requires much more than
apathy. Like Pepper, we see space for the modern-day corporate lawyer to engage in a
process of moral dialogue with their clients, while still doing what the client is seeking
to do within the bounds of the law.115 We also – perhaps somewhat naively, given what
our data suggests, and given the swathes of work on the neoliberal transformation of
the legal profession116 – see the power and potential in corporate lawyers acting as
public service norm intermediaries; acting as checks, or wise counsellors, on decision
making by their corporate clients. Put simply, we are of the view that the renewable
energy lawyer should care that his client’s solar panels are being made by slave labour;
and not just because ‘caring’ makes good business sense.
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